Titoism

Definition

Titoism is a term taken from the name of Yugoslavia’s president. It refers to that country’s brand of socialism which was developed after Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948. Two main features of titoism were worker’s self-management and nonalignment. Self-management which went through various stages of elaboration / I will talk about them later/ was introduced in the early 1950s. Nonaligned brought Tito’s influence to the third World and it was formalized at the Belgrade conference of nonaligned nations in 1961. Titoism rejected the Western capitalist system, but also distanced Yugoslavia from Soviet model which was denounced as undemocratic. Titoism was an unsuccessful experiment to found a third alternative to development and modernization in the twentieth century.

The birth of a new Yugoslavia

During the Second World War Yugoslavia in fact ceased to exist. In Zagreb an » independent State of Croatia» under Italo/German protection had already been proclaimed with fascist Ustashe of Ante Pavelic in charge. It included Bosnia and Hercegovina but not a large part of Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands which were annexed by Italy. The ustasha regime took as its first task the ethnic and religious purification which meant the extermination of Serbs /15% of Croatia and a third of Bosnia population through forced conversions from orthodox to catolic religion and massacre. Slovenia disappeared from the map, part was annexed to Italy and Hungary and part to German Reich. Montenegro was declared a kingdom again, its crown united with Italian occupiers, the Kosovo region with its Albanian majority became part of an Albania which was under direct rule of Italy. The Bulgarians occupied and anticipated annexing Yugoslav Macedonia. The Hungarians annexed beside Prekmurje and Also Medjimirje, Barnja and Backa. Vojvodina was mostly directed direct by Volksdeutsch minority. Serbia was occupied by Germans and administered by local collaborator general Milan Nedic.

Resistance was maintained in Yugoslavia by rival guerilla groups the serbian Chetniks under general Mihailović and the communist lead partisans under Tito. Allied help, orginally given to Mihailovic was shifted to Tito because of the collaboration of Chetniks with the Germans.

New Yugoslavia was born on November 29 1943 in the Bosnian town of Jajce. That happened in the midst of a holocaust of resistance, revenge and inter ethnic civil war. The event was the second session of an Anti/Fasist Council of national Liberation of Yugoslavia /AVNOJ/. AVNOJ was the formally supreme political organ of a National Liberation Movement, it means partisans, created and led by the Communist party of Yugoslavia. AVNOJ had been established one year earlier, when 54 representatives of partisan movement from all regions except Slovenia and Macedonia held first session at Bihac, another Bosnia town, to create a political organisation of liberation movement.

In Jajce AVNOJ proclaimed himself as provisional parliament and established a national Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia as its executive organ with all the attributes of such a governement. The head of the Committee was to be Josip Broz, called Tito 51 year

Croat and partly Slovene origin. Tito in that time was supreme commander of the national Liberation Army and secretary general of communist party. AVNOJ also proclaimed him Marshal of Yugoslavia.

AVNOJ proclaimed that the new Yugoslavia would be a federal State. Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins should have a republic of its own. Bosnia and Hercegovina with mixed population of Serbs, Croats and Serbo/Croatian speaking Moslem Slavs would constitute a sixth republic.

It was also confirmed proclamation of annexing Istria and Rijeka, Trieste, Goricia, Zadar and some Adriatic islands recently issued by the Liberation front of Slovenia and the regional Anti/Fascist Council of national Liberation of Croatia /that territory belonged to Italy under treaties of 1920 and 1924/.

King Peter was prohibited from returning to the country until post war plebiscite should determine the fate of monarchy, and the right of the Royal Government in exile to represent Yugoslavia or to make international agreements in its name was denied.

At the start of resistance movement in 1941 there was for several months sporadic cooperation and no clear line of demarcation between the two resistance movements, although isolated clashes also occurred. Mihailovic who was official war minister of king’s government in exile and Tito, leader of communist resistant movement met twice but they didn’t find common language, despite the pressure of British and Russians, on both to unified resistance front. The struggle between the two movements soon took precedence over the battle with the common enemy. By the winter of 1943/44 there were three orientations in Yugoslavia: those who identify themselves with occupiers and Hitler’s new order in Europe, the chetniks, whose solution was the restoration of the old centralized Yugoslavia with the king and under Serbian domination and members of partisan resistance movement who were protagonists of a new, federal, but clearly Communist dominated Yugoslavia.

Partisan movement was formally recognized by Allied forces on Teheran Conference, which was held the same week as Jajce meeting. Tito met the Churchill in Naples in August 1944 (also Stalin in Moscow in september 1944). After that Royal Government in exile headed by Croat Ivan Subasic was ready to recognise and deal with Tito. A new Yugoslav Provisional Government was created on March 7, 1945. Tito became the last Royal Yugoslav prime minister and minister of defence and accepted Subasic and two other members of Government in exile in his cabinet. Yugoslavia again had a single Government for the first time since Jajce. The partisan regime had achieved the international legitimacy. AVNOJ was enlarged with the members of last Yugoslav parliament from 1938 who were not compromised by collaboration with enemy. King was formally represented with Regency of three politicians. AVNOJ met for the third time in August 1945 and converted to Provisional national parliament. A Communist dominated People’s front (a peace time metamorphosis of the People’s Liberation Front, organization, created by communist’s during the last two years of war) won on elections for the Consituent Assembly. 95% of voters voted the single list presented by people’s front while prewar parties boycotted the elections (partly they were included in People’s front). Non communist ministers had resigned to protest their exclusion from all effective decision making. On November 1945 Assembly abolished the monarchy and declared Yugoslavia as federal People’s republic.

In new state due to the special position of Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the party mechanism called democratic centralism, was very effectively, though informally passed
on to the rest of the society. This prevented everyone, except the most important party leaders, to start any public discussion about the relations among nationalities, and the relations to the centre respectively, for as long as the mid-sixties. The national question was regarded as solved; some "deviations" were being treated by the highest state-party leadership. The internal borders were administratively drawn. In some cases they were discussed in the National Assembly (like in the case of dividing Sandžak) but mostly they were only discussed by individual politicians in telephone conversations (like in the case of some Macedonian, Bosnian and some other territories).

**Yugoslav stalinism**

The new regime had five sources of legitimacy: the first was power in Communist hands before the war ended. The second was international recognition and legal continuity with the old Yugoslav regime achieved with compromises with the Allies and the Government in exile. The third was partizan war. The fourth was won on elections: despite that they were undemocratic, people mostly supported communist party and people's front. The fifth, relevant only for communists was historical imperative to achieve the last history step by marxistical theory: the rule of worker's class incarnate in power of it's avantgarda : communist party.

The constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia adopted by the Constituent Assembly on January 31, 1946 was modelled on Soviet Constitution of 1936. Constitution formally institutionalised the six people’s republic promised at Jajce. It is also established within Serbia two autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo (Kosovo was at first autonomous region with less rights than Vojvodina). With this there was imagination for many Yugoslavs and outside observers that the national question really had been solved. Despite federal constitution in legislation and practice in postwar Yugoslavia was centralised. Bicameral federal Assembly was composed of delegates from the republics and provinces, but most of effective legislative and executive powers were vested in the Assembly's presidium and in the Government. Really power was concentrated in the politbiro of central committee.

Yugoslavia had suffered very much in the war, so the first goal of authorities was renovation and reconstruction of all infrastructure. The second goal were agrarian reform (done before elections to acquire the votes of farmers and to award them for cooperation in resistance movement) and nationalisation. Most of Yugoslavia’s pre war industries and mines and a large part of the commercial and banking network had been foreign owned and by the end of war was in German hands. This property and property of collaborators (for this accusation was enough that they had kept their factories open and had sold the products to occupiers) was confiscated. Under decree issued in November 1944. Fully 80% of Yugoslav industry had already been nationalised before the first nationalisation law, whish passed in December 1946. A second Nationalisation Law was enacted in April 1948, affecting remaining industries, smaller enterpriesers etc (there was also third nationalisation of apartments in 1958).

In early 1946 a decision had been taken to proceed with rapid and extensive industrialization on the Soviet pattern, complete with five years plan. The plan was officially inaugurated in April 1947, it was very ambitious. On the basis of 1939 levels it called for five times increase in total industrial output and electric power. It concentrated on basic industries like iron and steel and on big industries and big hydro and thermo/electrical plans, demand big investments on long period. The plan also placed the majority of project in the less developed regions, particulary in Bosnia/Heryegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. Authorities pledges to equalise prosperity and opportunities in all regions and
provided jobs for all people. In that days the most important party’s ideologist Milovan Djilas said that Yugoslavia will catch up with England in per capita production of goods within in ten years. It was going for some sort ecstasy of big ideas and goals, for enthusiasm and voluntarism of leadership, but also for mass support of which the regime boasted. Some sort of »attack on the sky«. »Heros of the struggle should be succeed by heros of the work, said Boris Kidric, the principal architect of Yugoslav economic policies in first afterwar years. This plan needed large and centralised apparatuses. With the reorganisation of federal, republican and local government to cope with the five year Plan, the Yugoslav political/economic system came very close to its Soviet model and became a single, giant, countrywide and monopolistic trust. Yugoslav communistic system achieved a soviet organization of the society just in few years, much sooner than soviet model themselves after October revolution (as you know the industrialization in Soviet Union was finished only in the middle of thirties.

The break with Stalin

The reasons for break were:
- the uniqueness of Yugoslav revolution
- Tito’s international ambitions, activities and initiatives which suggested that he was aspiring to become an autonomous viceroy of south/eastern Europe
- Stalin’s decision to proceed equalizing (Gleichschaltung) of the East European people; s democracies and to produce of a monolithical socialistic block under Soviet control
- the personal characteristics of Stalin and Tito

First grievances had the roots even in war time. Partisans and Tito resented to Russians that they didn’t sent them material assistance in the early years of the war (that was very depressing for partisans also because of their naive faith in Soviet power), than Soviet attitudes to the Chetniks and Royal government in exile, Soviet contrairy to change AVNOJ in representative body of partisan movement. Soviet leadership also opposed to revolutionary ambitions of partisan movement (they were for example even against revolutionary symbols like red star with hammer and sickle which wered elite proletarian brigades in Yugoslavia. Tito also resented Stalin deals over Yugoslavia with Churchill in Moscow when he learned of it after the war and with Churchill and Roosevelt at Yalta. Tito ignored Stalin’s advises with which Stalin wanted to avoid damaging inter Allied relations because of using the war for revolutionary purposes. Tito also didn’t allowed to Red Army to stay in Yugoslavia after final operations in which it helped liberated Belgrade, Serbia nad some other places in Yugoslavia. Stalin’s resent ti Tito was also his independ internal policy, especially his independent initiative in meeting Churchill in Naples just before fifty/fifty agreement.

After war Russians opposed Tito’s Trieste policy because they were not ready to risk confrontation with the West and later his support to communist in Greece. Tito was very popular in the new countries of people’s democracies, on his travel in some of them he had been enthusiastic receped. He had clear intention to unite Albania with Yugoslavia, he negotiated with Bolgaria about federation and wanted to create East European or Balkan confederation. Altough Stalin himself had initiated or approved plans of this kind his matter was different: to reach communistic empire with leading role of Soviet Union and uniform position of other countries and not independ subsystems with strong and popular leaders like Tito. Yugoslav communist after war were discovering the Soviet Union as an arrogant and imperialist great power rather than a comradely and Communist one. Such feelings were also provoked by arogant behaviour of the Red Army and Soviet military and
technical advisers. Conditions offered by soviet side in negotiations about creation of Soviet / Yugoslav joint-stock companies were intolerably exploitative.

The basic issue in the great quarrel of 1948 was very simple: whether Tito and his Politbiro or Stalin would be dictator of Yugoslavia.

The ideological dimension of the quarrel was negligible. People’s democracy in Yugoslavia was confirm by Stalin and his ideologists and even more. It was an example for other East European communist parties how to achieve the power. Soviet side reproached to Yugoslav communists that they distributed land among farmers and didn’t collectivise the countryside and also that they »hidden« Communist Party behind People’s front and continued to behave an illegal, conspiratorial organisation. But this reproach were generally irrelevant and hypocritical. In the long respond of Yugoslav communists on Soviet reproach one sentence was fundamental: «No matter how much each of us loves the land of socialism, the USSR, he can in no case love his own country less.»

Soviet Union wanted to disciplined Yugoslav communist party through international communist organization named Informburo. But they didn’t agree with that, Tito’s standpoint was that Soviet is attack the attack on independent state and not the question of ideological discrepancies among communist parties.

The Yugoslav experiment with an independent and original road to socialism was born of necessity, not on conviction. (despite that you can find theories at some Yugoslav and also Slovenian historians, that self management started even during the second world war with creation of people’s committees). In 1948 and even latter the party elite could not imagine that socialism could be built in any way that differed essentially from the Soviet model. Even the break with Stalin did not seem to them at first to be hopeless. When they were forced to rethink their institutions and their ideology that was in large measure dictated by circumstances: isolation from Soviet block, economic blockade, political and military pressure, break down with domestic soviet economic machinery and later consequent dependence of western aid and trade for survival, what brought extensive contacts with Western ideas, technology and institutions.
Parallel with the criticism of Soviet regime and its ideology and efforts to distinguish new formatted Yugoslav system from Soviet precendents Yugoslavia also kept the distance from Western system.

On personal level this change was not easy. Two years from split with Soviet Union to start of introducing new system gave members of the elite to adapt themselves, psychologically and ideologically to new situation. Despite that the confusion, personal traumas and the continued dogmatism infected more or less all members of leading group. Even Tito, who was not very ideological person (his motto basically was to stay in power) with instinctual sense of danger and with experience of Soviet purges in thirties based on soviet experience. The fifth party Congress in 1948 (first after Dreseden in 1928) supported Tito, but opening and ending ceremony ended with chants Long live the fraternal Soviet Union, Long live the leader and teacher of progressive humanity Comrade Stalin, Long live the Great Soviet Union with the genius Stalin at his head. The Congress message to new elected central committee was to do everything in its power to liquidate the misunderstanding with the parties of Cominform. The intensity of the psychologial trauma was also manifest in the psychosomatic illness which Tito, Kidric and some other leaders suffered in that time. Hope was, that this nightmare will pass somehow.
First reaction on this situation was that Yugoslav communist party became more stalinistic that Stalin. Collectivisation of agruculture was to proceed with more boldness and
increased tempo. Even in 1952 Tito himself could still see no alternative to collectivisation in some form Yugoslav foreign policy also continued to follow the Soviet line. Purges, trials and isolation on Adriatic islands of so called »cominformists« it means people under suspicion that they are supporting Stalin, became epidemic. When Vladimir Dedijer later said once, that there was difference from Soviet Union in pressure and that Yugoslavia didn’t have its own Siberia, Tito responded: »We don’t have a Siberia, but if we had one, we would have sent people there.«

With help of American policy »to keep Tito afloat« start in 1950 Yugoslavia survived and even come close to Nato with Balkan pact in 1954 (full military alliance with Greece and Turkey). Total help of american economic assistance was almost six hundred dollars and official price of military help almost the same.

The new relationship between Yugoslavia and the West politically ended the country’s isolation it soon led to diplomatically useful contacts with the new states of third world and non alignet movement. The country avoid starvation, orient foreign trade from east to west. And this contacts had an important impact on institution and ideology.

In 1949 at Yugoslav ideologists was luck of knowledge about alternatives. Ideology, like power remained highly centralised, in establishment of Titoism there was small group of men, personally recruited by Tito after 1937. They were connected very close, ideas bounced from one to another, so the original authorship of idea of self management is undiscoverable. One story is, that first initiator was Milovan Djilas, latter the famous Yugoslav disident. In the spring 1950 he found out, that Yugoslav communists are now in position to start creating Marx’ s free association of producers. The factories would be left in the hands of workers. The issue was debated for months in close circles before it was presented by Kardelj and Kidric to Tito in the lobby of federal Assembly. His first reaction was: Our workers are not ready for that yet.. Than Tito paced up and down, suddenly stopped and exclaimed: factories belonging to the workers, something that has never yet been achieved. A few months later Tito explained the worker’s self management bill to the National Assembly.

Wether or not these details are strictly accurate, the changes started. Administrative socialism turn to self management one. New law on local government organs permitted people’s committees a modest degree of fiscal autonomy. Meetings of voters were another innovation, they could nominate candidates for elections. In industrial enterprises worker’s councils were involved. Despite that effective control remained in the hands of directors and the State. The state administration was reorganized to reduce the number of federal bureaucrats: by July 1950 about 100 000 jobs in State and party bureaucracies had been abolished. The communist regime in Yugoslavia was no based on two untouchable founding myths: the partisan war and worker’s self/management.

*M*arket *socialism and socialist democracy*

The dominant historic task of the regime for the next decades was to be search for appropriate and politically acceptable mechanisms capable to work in the praxis. The Soviet system of planning was abondonned, the enterpreised enjozed a certain degree of genuine autonomy. Materials and equipment would be bought and products sold competitively on the market, credits to be repaid with interests not grants. This last passed very hard, because some politicians in the top thouht that this is return to capitalism. In 1953 the economy escaped from he stagnation and economical boom beginning, which was to continued almost for decade. With the economic reform in 1953 the system of State determination of rates of accumulations and funds which replaced administractive socialism at star of the fifties was changed again with the system of profit sharing. Profit
was enterprise net income after had been paid all costs, the taxes, social security etc. and
it was share with the local commune. Also agriculture sector was reorganized and
socialistic agricultural cooperatives were dissolved. Peasants could leave, taking their
equipment and land with them.

In 1953 constitution was changed or better said supplementing with constitutional law. The
1946 Constitution had assigned to the republics a large part of power. With the
constitutional law from 1953 more prerogatives were given to local authorities and
worker’s councils, associations of citizens formed in sectors like education, culture, health
services. At the federal level the Chamber of Nationalities of People’s Assembly in which
the republics and provinces were directly represented, delegated by the republican and
provincial assemblies, was absorbed into the Federal Chamber (in which representatives
were voted directly, one on every 60 000 Yugoslavs). A primary aspect of federalism was
degrade The second chamber in the federal Assembly was to be now a Chamber of
producers in which people were voted indirectly by different associations. This system
retain party control and abandonment the so called bourgeois concepts of political
representation. In the next years also open the national question in Yugoslavia for which
existed euphoric belief that really had been solved once for ever. With the constitutional
law also the post of president of the republic was restore.

In political life party formally wanted to separate itself from the state and from every day
political decision making and only stay as »an ideological and political leading force.« It
should influencing open and democratic on specific issues through education, propaganda
and the active participation of individual communists in the life and politics of enterprises,
worker’s councils, local government etc. In inner debates some leaders also considered
reintroducing a multiparty system as part of democratization. That was always rejected
and the same was with proposals to abandon communist party as political organization.
Milovan Djilas, who leaded in criticism of system and also of his own colleagues because
of their privileges was eliminated from political life and later imprisoned.
Party as political organization kept insuperable advantage over the unorganized forces of
the country’s non communists in election and in the people’s front. Party elite would
continue to occupy the key posts in the people’s Front, trade unions, municipal
governments, enterprise organs, management. So practically political reform consisted
only of change of name from communist party to league of communist on the 6th Congress
in 1952 and of some organizational changes inside league. Also people’s front changed
into Socialist Alliance of the Working people. Despite that even these changes for some
leading communists were too much, Tito was to declare two decades later, that he had
never liked the 6th Congress. His emphasis was always on so called democratic centralism
and party responsibility. But Yugoslav system after 1954 differed radically from that of
1949 when the first great debate about the nature of a socialistic State and economy
began. The role of the state in the economy and of the party of the state were both
indirect, there was no more monolithic global social system from 1949. All this changes not
yet had much effect on real life of ordinary people, but slowly the standard also started to
change.

Economic growth, political stagnation and reopening the national question in fifties

Two years after Stalin’s death in 1955 Khruschev came in Belgrade, excused Soviet policy
toward Yugoslavia and relations between states and parties were normalised. Relations in
fifties changes from the better to the worst, but basically position of Yugoslavia became
very important in international relations ship
Fundamental definition, that the national question in Yugoslavia was resolved by the revolution once and for all, first appeared in Program ZKJ /The Programme of Union of Communists/ in 1958, and it was kept on the doctrinaire level until the sixth Congress of ZKJ /Union of Communists of Yugoslavia/ in December 1964. The consequences of centralism and Serb hegemonism - particularly towards national minorities - started to show towards the end of 1950 s. In 1959, the leadership ordered an analyses about the position of national minorities, and so indirectly admitted, that their situation was not satisfactory. On ground of that analyses, the national problem was discussed more extensively for the first time after the war. But decentralized self-managing mechanism involved in fifties could not replace the role of republics because communities had different functions.

»Liberalism of sixties«

Towards the end of 1950 s and at the beginning of 1960 s, when economic crises started to arise, the monolith era within Yugoslav political top came to an end. Two political lines with different visions about further development opposed each other: the centralist one, which promoted the idea of a strong party, of control and repressive apparatus; and the more democratic one, with tendencies towards self-management, decentralisation and paying attention to the laws of economy. As a matter of fact, the question about the position of individual federal units was raised with might and main. The burden of conflict with the centre at time was carried by Slovene politicians. They already engaged in public polemics with advocates of centralism; Slovene delegation refused to vote for the economic plan for the year 1962, it even left the session of federal assembly (this happened for the first time in the post-war parliamentary practice); demands for decentralisation of economy appeared; Slovenia opposed the tax on extra profit (tax on diligence, as it was called in Slovenia); the culmination of the conflict was the politically initiated public polemics about the nature of "Yugoslavism" between Dušan Pirjevec and Dobrica Čosić. The fight for linguistic and cultural rights, which were constitutionally guaranteed, started as well. In this struggle Slovene politicians joined up with Slovene cultural workers (artists), and this also was a novelty for Slovene conditions. Slovene politicians and cultural workers (artists) opposed the federal supreme court to issue their decisions only in Serbo-Croat, even when Slovene cases were involved; the exclusive use of Serbo-Croat language on border crossings; the signs at railway stations in both Latin and Cyrillic characters; the subtitles on films and television in Serbo-Croat and sometimes even in Cyrillic characters; the lectures of civil defence at the university held in Serbo-Croat; the rejection of Slovene candidates for the diplomatic service by the federal centre.

Behind the centralist demands for unified text-books, unified curricula, unified federal funds for culture, centralised cultural exchange with foreign countries (all in the name of rationalisation and unified economy), was a tendency towards forming of common socialist culture as a sort of substitute for the non-existing Yugoslav nation. "Rationalisation" went so far, that they even tried to reduce state subsidy for the Slovene national minorities in Austria and Italy. The conflicts among nations and between republics and the centre respectively, started to turn up in other republics as well; in Serbia there were conflicts between autonomous provinces and the centre. The struggle for emancipation from the centre in Macedonia was - although slightly later - even stronger than in Slovenia and in Croatia. Tito tried to solve the arising conflict - the most serious one after Informbiro - by disciplinary measures of the leading republic politicians. (Sitting of the Executive Committee of CK ZKS, 14th - 16th May 1962). The sitting did not bring any solutions, the conflicts even deepened. The decision-making was therefore limited to Tito and to few people around him. Kardelj was not one of them; he was out of favour at that time. His
removal was one of the aims of the centralists. The discussion on the new constitution, which had already been announced in 1960 was postponed for some time and the arrangements for it started a year later. The discussion was renewed a few months later, in spring 1961. Its initial position was narrowed because of the centralist pressure. The constitution only included general principals about workers and social self-management, about income, remuneration according to work, the system of local administration, as well as about the basis of political system. The defensive attitude of the reform group was reflected in the constitution; it provided a "general" decentralization on account of the federalism of republics and the status of autonomous minorities decreased; republics were given the possibility to establish their own autonomous provinces according to "specific" attributes of particular areas; national minorities became "nationalities". Republican constitutions had to be - according to internal agreement - adapted copies of the federal, although the Slovene committee for constitution had bigger ambitions. It proceeded from the standpoint that republics were the fundamentals of state sovereignty, as well as of basic principals of the social system. Because of the balance of political power this course was, apart from some articles dealing with economy, not successful. On the whole it can be said, that regarding the 1963 Constitution, the centralists were more successful then the federalists; they managed to include more of their standpoints into it than the federalists. They also managed to redeem the demands for establishing Yugoslavia as a union of nations and imposed - at least in main points - their concept of the state as a union of communities. On the economic level they retained - through federal funds - the power of the centre. But also the federalists had some success; if nothing else, they refused the theory about republics being territorial units. The most important achievement for the federalists was the fact, that the political climate at the top started to change in the following months and that Tito's views started to change in their favour. This could first be seen more distinctly two years after the constitution was adopted. During the 8th Congress in December 1964, the leaders carefully started a discussion about the national question. The decision about that was made in the last moment. In spite of simultaneous criticism of centralism and nationalism, the basic reaction was oriented against the "grand-Serbö thesis that it was a misfortune for Yugoslavia to be a multinational state, and also against the view point of some Yugoslav intellectuals (also of the circle around Praxis), that nations are actually an exploded, out of date formation. This theory, which was due to fast technological development and integration, was quite widely spread among a number of European intellectuals of that time. In any case, the congress opened an until then tabooed theme, although there was no reaction to the speeches of Tito, Kardelj and Vlahović, the only ones, who spoke about the national question. Soon afterwards the decision to start an economic reform was reached. In behind-the-scene fights with Ranković, Kardelj, assisted by the Slovene political top and advocates of federalism in other republics, patiently built up his role of a chief Yugoslav ideologist. After he was securely the support of Tito and the most influential Croat politician Vladimir Bakarić, he presented his concept of the reform of federation at the sitting of Executive Committee of CK ZKJ (November 1965).According to Kardelj, there were three opposing basic orientations existing in Yugoslavia. The first one was - because of their own economic interest - supported by representatives of the underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia). They expected the greatest possible help from the federation and therefore supported centralization of economy. Croatia And Slovenia were in favour of the second orientation. They wanted to get emancipated from the federation in every aspect possible. The third, hegemonic orientation found its advocates in Serbia. The centralist structure of power in Yugoslavia made Kardelj believe that the hegemonic concept had the most chances to be implemented, after the leading revolutionaries would be gone. Therefore he suggested republic should become states; the role of federation should be the one of a "green table"
where the states could coordinate their politics, and a service, which would implement common functions and the agreed politics. At the same time he suggested to accelerate the reform of the economy. Yugoslav economic system was to be specific: based on social ownership (of means of production) it was to follow the principles of market economy. Yugoslavia being a socialist federation, he also planned some security measures to secure the political power for the party (uniform army, uniform party which functions on the principle of democratic centralism and Tito as the highest authority, combining the three functions (state, party and military) in one person. The leading position of the working class and its avant-garde ZkJ (Union of Communists of Yugoslavia) was not to be changed and this was to enable existence of Yugoslavia in future (it was Kardelj’s belief, that Yugoslav federation was formed above all because of socialism). Resistance against the proposed reform was strong, (for the fear ZKJ could start to lose power because of it) there were doubts even among those, who at first supported it. It came into life after the plenum at Brioni and after Ranković was removed in July 1966. The first changes of the system which concerned the reform of the federation and which did away with the worst centralist anomalies were introduced as late as in June 1967, when federal assembly adopted constitutional amendments. In the next years they were followed - because of strong national and liberal pressure in some republics and also because of the nationalistic outbursts (for example in Kosovo in 1968 and in Croatia in 1971) - by additional amendments, which strengthened the autonomy of republics.

The 1974 constitution (behind-the-scene struggle was much harder than the one for the 1963 constitution) did introduce a confederate model. In its essence, however, it was a compromise and inconsistent constitution. It offered national rights in exchange for democracy, not along with it; technically it confirmed the victory of the conservative orientation (constitutionally guaranteed leading role of ZkJ); it also provided the basis for the introduction of an ineffective economic system (economic reform was then stopped in 1971). Since there was no real democracy within republics, republic oligarchies sprang up with the federalization and within the competence gained, they could - without any control - manage affairs on their own. Apart from that, Serb leadership and the army never really accepted the new constitution and acted against it right from the beginning. The new constitution therefore never really worked, decisions were made beyond the bodies of the assembly and until Tito s death Yugoslavia functioned as a sort of semi-federation.

Yugoslavia after Tito’s death, the end of ‘titioism’

The first post-Tito years were characterized by trying to keep a sort of balance and afterwards by a complicated and confused system of collective managing with short mandates and presidents on duty. From the mid-eighties on, strong centralist and hegemonic pressures along with conflicts among the nations (similar to those from the beginning of 1960’s) started again, and finally they lead to war and disintegration of Yugoslavia. In 1980 s, after Tito s death an unsuccessful period of "defending the constitution" started in Slovenia and some other republics. On the other hand, civil society and informal opposition with its own programmes and views about the position of Slovene nation, started to rouse. This was a new and fresh break-through within Slovene statehood. The most noticeable appreciation of the position of Slovene nation within Yugoslav federation, as well as the vision of the future development was published by Nova revija - a magazine of intellectual opposition - in its Nr. 57 at the beginning of 1987 (after the memorandum of Serb Academy of Sciences And Art became known in 1986, which strove for the implementation of the Serb national programme). Under the circumstances of strong polarization in 1988, federal constitutional reforms only comprised the economic part and the functioning of some federal institutions. The changes involved
were on account of republic competencies, but they did not really affect their constitutional position. The opposition to constitution was due to the justified fear of renewed centralization as manifested in Serb demand for the so called third Yugoslavia. Slovenia started to change its constitutional status within Yugoslavia with its own constitutional changes (Serbia did that earlier by degrading both autonomous provinces); the emancipation was in progress also in other areas; one of the crucial events was the parting of Slovene communists with ZKJ during the 14th congress in January 1990. With the formation of formal opposition towards the end of the 1980s, three options existed within Slovenia at different times, within different contexts, and with different political forces: asymmetrical federation, confederation and independence. Oppositional forces were more in favour of independence (disintegration), until they gained power in May 1990, whereas the socialist authority (which had to carry the burden of pressure from the centre) tried to find compromise solutions. Since the change of power, when former opposition was faced with reality (also of international relations and pressures from related parties abroad), most Slovene politicians were principally in favour of confederate model. At the same time the republic was preparing for the defense of the already achieved, and looking for allies abroad. Referendum results in December 1989 showed that most Slovene citizens voted for independent Slovene state (from the poll of 93.3%, 88.2 voted for independence). The plebiscite decision itself was not opposed to a loose connection with other republics (as in Benelux states and similar associations), but in spite of hard negotiations, there was no consensus for such solutions within Yugoslav top. An armed intervention of Yugoslav army in June 1991 whose aim was to prevent the independence of Slovenia, meant a final separation from Yugoslavia and at the same time a rapid disintegration of the state. After the process of Slovene emancipation was frozen for three months (as resolved in negotiations with federal authorities under the cover of European Community), with the adoption of a new constitution in December 1991 and simultaneous international recognition of Slovenia as well as with its admission to UN in May 1992, the Slovene history with Yugoslav federalism and also with »titoism« came to an end. Slovenians believed in it for a long time and they invested a lot of energy in its planning and development.

Nevertheless, Yugoslav federation was never able to function without compulsory cohesive measures from outside or inside factors in the course of its existence. When they fell away (the decline of socialism and lifting of the iron curtain, the disintegration of the party and of the army), it could not find a democratic alternative for its existence. It still remains to be seen in what way the newly established states on the territory of former Yugoslavia will regulate the relations among each other.

Migrations in the territory of former Yugoslavia from 1945 until present time /today/2

Since the second half of the 19th century, migrations in the territory of former Yugoslavia were strong and frequent. Its reasons were of economic, political and religious nature. The most important economic reasons were economic retardation, agrarian over-population and the growing birth rate. Of the political and religious reasons the most important ones before 1945 were the change of the state format (i.e. the inclusion of Kosovo and Metohija into Serbia and later into Yugoslavia. The consequence was a mass migration of the Turks and also of the Albanians or the inclusion of the Bosnia and Herzegovina into Austria Hungary, which provoked similar processes among the Muslims. The unsuccessful rebellions against the Turks (i.e. the llinden rebellion at the beginning of the 20th century) can also be attributed to the religious and political reasons. Due to the new borders After

World War I, there were further mass migrations which resulted in the emergence of numerous strong national minorities. Out of 300,000 of the Coastal Slovenians who became Italian citizens, over 70,000 migrated partly to Yugoslavia, partly to the overseas countries, predominantly the USA and South America. From the end of the 19th century until World War II there were also temporary migrations due to seasonal work (falling trees, work in the fields), which usually lasted a few months. From the end of the 19th century until the beginning of World War II almost 1,000,000 people left the country for the USA, Canada, Australia, South America and several European countries (mostly France, Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany - above all Westfallen).

World War II was characterised by refugees, mass – mostly forced - migrations (deportations), i. e. of the Serbs from Croatia or the Slovenes to Serbia, Croatia and Germany, and the colonisation of the evacuated territories by German population (in Slovenia this meant, that 15,000 members of the Götscher German minority were settled in the homes of the deported Slovenians in the Posavje and the Obsotelje region.

After World War II, the first wave of emigrants from all republics consisted of political emigrants (members of collaborationist units and their families; people who could not accept communism). Most of them fled at the end of the war, however, the allies returned a part of them. An exact number of people who fled the country after the war has never been established, yet the estimations go up to several hundred thousands. A part of the emigration wave consisted of the members of the German and the Italian nationality. Almost all the members of the numerous German national minority emigrated after World War II (the reasons being mass nazification and the collaboration in the occupational apparatus during World War II). Based on the agreement between the Yugoslav and the Italian government on the possibility of the choice of citizenship, the majority of Italian population moved from Slovenia and Croatia; yet the Italian minority - contrary to the German - was preserved and eventually gained strong protection as a minority.

Due to the victims of war and post-war migrations, Yugoslavia is estimated to have lost between 2,1000 and 2,9000 of its inhabitants (the numbers were frequently a subject of political manipulations). After that, the population started to grow - from 15 million it grew to 22 million at the beginning of the eighties, which corresponds to the growth of 41,6%. The birth rate in the more developed parts of the country (i.e. Slovenia and Croatia) was 20%, whereas it amounted to 60% in the less developed parts and even to 116% in Kosovo. Until the beginning of the sixties, there had been no further mass migrations, which is among others due to the fact that Yugoslavia was a politically closed and isolated country (disputes with the western allies because of the border, disputes with the Soviet Union because of the Inform biro). The settlement of the border issues in the mid-fifties and the gradual opening of the country resulted in the increased wave of economic emigration.

In the forties, the internal migrations were first caused by colonisation. From mountainous areas of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, people were moved to fertile Vojvodina, to the possessions, which previously belonged to Germans. These colonisations brought about numerous national and psychological consequences. People from the mountains were not used to the farming in the plain country; between them and the natives conflicts occurred even if they were of the same nationality - the cultural differences were simply too big. Another aspect of the migrations was that the authorities wanted to change the nationality structure, particularly in regard with the strong Hungarian minority in Vojvodina.

The second wave of migrations was caused by the accelerated industrialisation in the mid-fifties, which was carried out in Yugoslavia according to the Soviet model. Several hundred thousands of mostly unskilled workers moved to the towns. Since the politically initiated industrialisation was not followed by setting up an appropriate infrastructure (flats, schools, kindergartens, shops, services, etc.), the settling was more or less carried out
spontaneously, by erecting improvised housing units from which people only very gradually moved to the big, newly built residential quarters.

Slovenia turned to become the largest immigration area. In the mid-fifties, it was the first Yugoslav republic to change from a predominantly agrarian into a predominantly industrialised society, the consequence being a constant influx of people from other republics. On the whole, till 1990, over 289 000 people moved to Slovenia, as opposed to the 207 000 who left it (out of which over 70 000 went to western European countries; the rest of them either returned home to their respective republics, or moved elsewhere, mostly to the west). As you may know, Slovenia has a population of less than two million; according to the national census of 1991, 87.6% were of Slovenian nationality. In 1990, the total rise of the population due to immigration thus amounted to 140 000 people.

In the period between 1960 and 1966, about 380 000 people moved from Yugoslavia to other countries; mostly due to economic reasons. In the mid-seventies when the emigration was at its peak and the needs for labour force in the Western-European countries the biggest, about 1 400 000 people used to be on the so-called "temporary labour" abroad. After that, the number began to fall gradually (about 400 000 returned home). In the mid-eighties it amounted to a million clear. In the first period, most economic emigrants came from Serbia (37% of the total number), later from Croatia (24%). In the eighties, however, there was an increased influx of emigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina; in the mid-eighties, 180 000 emigrants from this republic used to work in Western-European countries.

For the former Yugoslavia economic emigrants was be a very special psychological-sociologic phenomenon. On the one hand they presented a strong economic support for the country (most of them kept their money in Yugoslav banks, they built houses of their own, supported their relatives), yet on the other, they brought the market mentality into the socialist society, imported the most up-to-date domestic appliances and western cultural patterns. Particularly before the holidays, the mass migrations led to indescribable crowds of people waiting at the border crossings.

The last wave of migration from Yugoslavia affected the country because of the political, the national and religious, and partly also because of economic reasons during the wars (1991 - 1996). During the war, a methodical ethnic cleansing was carried out. According to different sources, about three million people either emigrated or moved away. In 1994, there were almost 700 000 refugees from former Yugoslavia in various European countries. The ethnically cleansened areas were Bosnia and Herzegovina, the territories of Croatia previously inhabited by the Serb population, and to a large extend also Kosovo (as early as in the eighties, several tens of thousands Serbs moved away).

During the 45 years of its existence, the second, socialist Yugoslavia thus went through numerous migration waves - both, internal and external. Whereas the politically motivated migrations took place during World War II, immediately after it and then again during the recent wars in the nineties, the economic migrations were going on in the fifties and the sixties of the previous century (the internal ones as a result of industrialisation and the external due to the surplus of the labour force), and partly in the nineties (i. e. from Serbia, from which about 300 000 young people moved because of poverty and hopelessness. Due to political and economic reasons, the newly established states in the territory of former Yugoslavia are more or less closed and the formerly strong migration currents thus interrupted (with the partial exception of returning of the refugees, which seems to be very slow). In the formerly more developed parts of the country, predominantly Slovenia, there is a new need to import labour force, partly for unskilled work and partly for the highly skilled one (i.e. doctors), for whom there is a major shortage in Slovenia.